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Abstract
The accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in  greatly affected
attitudes toward nuclear energy in many countries, including Switzerland. In this
study, we analyzed the evolution of public opinion about nuclear energy in
Switzerland from  to  to determine how different dimensions of attitudes
toward nuclear energy changed in the years following the accident and which factors
influenced general opinion about nuclear energy. The primary findings show that
public opinion about nuclear energy became only slightly more positive as time
passed and that the most important predictor of the general opinion about nuclear
energy was the individual assessment of its benefits and risk.
Switzerland is one of the  countries that currently operate nuclear power
plants. In fact, the five nuclear energy reactors in the four Swiss nuclear
power plants account for % of Switzerland’s domestic electricity generation
(International Atomic Energy Agency, ). Although nuclear energy has
several benefits, including generally low greenhouse gas output (Brook &
Bradshaw, ; Vaillancourt, Labriet, Loulou, & Waaub, ), nuclear
energy production also inevitably involves risks, as demonstrated by the acci-
dent at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on March , .
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After the plant was struck by a tsunami caused by a seaquake, four of its six
reactors experienced a core meltdown (World Nuclear Association, ),
thereby casting new light on the risk of nuclear energy production and causing
public belief in the security of nuclear technology to falter (Holmberg, ;
Newport, ; Prati & Zani, ; Turcanu, Perko, & Schröder, ;
Visschers & Siegrist, ). In the wake of the accident, debates in many
countries addressed whether the benefits of nuclear energy were worth the
damage it could cause, and as a result, three countries—Belgium, Germany,
and Switzerland—decided to phase out nuclear energy. However, in one or
more popular referenda possible in the future, Swiss citizens could be involved
in future decisions regarding the extent to which Switzerland eradicates nu-
clear power.
During –, the general attitude of Swiss citizens toward nuclear
energy was more or less stable. The so-called Angstbarometer, a yearly survey
of roughly  Swiss citizens, indicates how much the Swiss public worries
about radioactive contamination on a -point scale ( ¼ Not worried,  ¼
Highly worried), and from  to , the mean response was .–. (GfS-
Zürich, ). In , a political debate over investments in new nuclear
energy plants began when three nuclear energy plant operators—namely, Atel
(currently Alpiq), BKW, and Axpo—applied for construction permits. In
February , a regional referendum in the canton of Berne showed that
the small majority of the population there favored nuclear energy, as .%
voted for the construction of a new plant to replace the existing one.1
Following the severe nuclear accident at Fukushima, however, that climate
of opinion changed. The Angstbarometer showed a rise from . in  to
. in  (GfS-Zürich, ), suggesting that the accident at Fukushima
triggered the reconsideration of nuclear energy in general and discussions of
whether its benefits truly justify its risks.
Of course, such reconsideration of nuclear energy and its risks attracted
heavy coverage in media, both in Switzerland and around the world. As one
study has shown, following the accident, two important Swiss quality national
newspapers shifted from using a generally neutral to a rather negative tone in
coverage that overwhelmingly focused more on the detriments of nuclear
energy than their benefits (Kristiansen, forthcoming). Combined with a
change in the valence of coverage, such heavy attention to nuclear energy
created a context in which initial political decisions for a stepwise phasing
out of nuclear energy in Switzerland made clear sense from the perspective of
political actors involved. However, less than a year after the accident, media
coverage entered into a reconsideration phase of the risks of nuclear power. As
attention to nuclear energy’s potential detriments remained high, coverage of
1Cantons are federal entities in Switzerland similar to U.S. states.
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nuclear energy’s benefits revived and even reached levels similar to those
before the accident.
Today, the general change observed in the climate of opinion and in media
coverage in Switzerland following the accident at Fukushima remains incom-
pletely understood. Although Visschers and Siegrist () have shown that
trust greatly affected perceived risks and benefits of nuclear energy directly
before and following the accident and, in turn, influenced public acceptance of
nuclear power stations, that study addressed only short-term effects immedi-
ately after the accident. As such, an important gap in the research remains, for
neither the dynamics of public opinion about nuclear energy nor factors that
influence that opinion have been analyzed regarding the years after the acci-
dent at Fukushima. Consequently, though researchers have a fairly strong idea
of what happened to public opinion about nuclear energy immediately after
the accident, they know far less about what happened to it in the years fol-
lowing the event. This study addresses that gap.
Risk Perception and Public Opinion
Theoretical and empirical research that has addressed the perception of risks
and formation of opinion regarding technologies such as nuclear energy
(Siegrist, ), biotechnology (Bauer & Gaskell, ; Sjöberg, ), and
nanotechnology (Cacciatore et al., ; Ho, Scheufele, & Corley, ) is
plentiful. From a technical point of view, the definition of risk is straightfor-
ward: It is the product of the magnitude of potential damage and the prob-
ability of its occurrence. However, people rarely perceive and process the
concept of risk in that way. In response, newer theoretical perspectives,
including the social amplification of risk framework (Kasperson et al., ;
Pidgeon, Kasperson, & Slovic, ; Renn, Burns, Kasperson, Kasperson, &
Slovic, ; Slovic, ), conceptualize the perception and acceptance of risk
as a complex process influenced not only by the objective nature of a risky
technology such as nuclear energy or a risk event such as the nuclear disaster
at Fukushima, but also by various underlying social and psychological factors
of individuals in interaction with communication processes.
Sociodemographics
The perception and acceptance of technology-related risks vary according to
underlying sociodemographic characteristics of a population or country
(Eurobarometer, ). Men, younger people, and better-educated people per-
ceive biotechnology and nuclear energy to be less risky than do women, older
people, and less educated people. However, underlying psychological and
social factors mediate and thus inform those differences. For example,
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education relates to and is a prerequisite of knowledge and information acqui-
sition via media about science and technology.
Fundamental Values and Lifestyles
Values and lifestyle—for instance, postmaterialism and the appreciation of
nature—usually correlate with higher risk perceptions and more negative at-
titudes toward biotechnology and nuclear energy, whereas an affinity for sci-
ence and technology correlates with lower levels of risk perception and more
positive attitudes (Whitfield, Rosa, Dan, & Dietz, ).
Preexisting Attitudes
Albeit mediated by trust in scientists and experts, attitudes for or against a
specific technology or science and technology in general influence the risk
perception and acceptance of specific technologies. As Brossard and Nisbet
(, p. ) have pointed out, ‘‘deference to scientific authority,’’ especially
among less informed publics, seems to be ‘‘a central value predisposition
shaping support for agricultural biotechnology.’’ Moreover, as Yeo et al.
() have concluded, ideological groups responded differently to the disaster
at Fukushima and according to their party identifications. For instance, risk
perceptions among conservatives decreased following the accident.
Benefits Versus Costs
From a perspective prioritizing rational choice, underlying values and preex-
isting attitudes regarding nuclear energy usually relate to the importance that
an individual ascribes to, for example, low-priced, reliable, and clean energy
sources. As a consequence, the perceived costs and benefits of nuclear energy
act as mediating factors of risk perception and acceptance. People who asso-
ciate low costs and high benefits with nuclear energy are more willing to
accept the risks of nuclear energy. As Visschers and Siegrist (, p. )
have posited, even a nuclear accident such as the one at Fukushima would not
affect the basic relationship between perceived benefits and costs, for ‘‘the
nuclear accident did not seem to have changed the relations between the
determinants of acceptance.’’ Accordingly, people would continue to consider
the benefits of nuclear energy to be relevant and trust nuclear power stations,
even after a severe event such as Fukushima.
Affect and Cognitive Shortcuts
Newer approaches to risk perception emphasize that risk processing and de-
cision-making not only constitute a cognitive process, but also change owing to
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affect-inducing risk communication (Sjöberg, b; Slovic, Finuncane,
Peters, & McGregor, ; Visschers et al., ). Guided by a so-called
media logic, media coverage of technology-related accidents and disasters in-
creasingly emphasizes more personalized, dramatized, and emotionalized stor-
ies of events. Consequently, the emotional cues presented in media narratives
evoke fear and elicit cognitive heuristics instead of rational decision-making
(Petty, Briñol, & Priester, ; Scheufele, ).
Media Information and Communication
Media information (Sjöberg, a) and interpersonal risk communication
(Binder, Scheufele, Brossard, & Gunther, ) influence risk perception,
and likewise, media coverage of new technologies usually varies in intensity
and appraisal. For a long time, biotechnology was only a marginal issue in
European media, and the framing of its media coverage was primarily positive
and emphasized scientific progress and economic benefits (Bauer & Gaskell,
). However, incidents such as the cloning of the sheep Dolly and subse-
quent public protests by nongovernmental organizations intensified coverage
and redirected its framing away from benefits and toward risks. Similarly,
media discourse about nuclear energy shifted from frames highlighting positive
progress to those emphasizing negative runaway and public accountability
(Gamson & Modigliani, ).
In the case of nuclear energy, the accident at Three Mile Island in
 (Cunningham, ; Nimmo & Combs, ) and the catastrophes
at Chernobyl in  (Friedman, Gorney, & Egolf, ; Rubin, )
and Fukushima in  dramatically increased media coverage of the risks
of nuclear energy production (Desai, ; Friedman, ; Hoetzlein,
; Ionescu, ; Katchanovski, ; Kristiansen & Bonfadelli, ;
Kubota, ; Perko, Turcanu, Geenen, Mamane, & van Rooy, ).
Those major events have also triggered heated follow-up discussions in
media and on social media platforms at the interpersonal level (Utz,
Schultz, & Glocka, ), particularly regarding the safety and risks of nuclear
energy. Assumably, the accident at Fukushima, its coverage, and public dis-
cussions about it precipitated a political debate that, in Germany and
Switzerland, prompted decisions to abandon nuclear energy production in
the future.
Societal, Political, and Cultural Context
The sociopolitical context of nuclear energy varies from country to country
(Eurobarometer, ). Some countries depend heavily on nuclear energy,
either for producing energy directly or in terms of their often export-oriented
nuclear energy industries. Although any nuclear accident will influence risk
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perceptions and public attitudes toward nuclear power not only in the country
of the accident, the effects might be weaker in countries that depend more
heavily on nuclear energy (Kubota, ).
From Risk Perception to Opinion Formation
Assumed theoretically and demonstrated empirically, risk perception trans-
lates into both risk acceptance and attitudes for or against a technology
such as nuclear energy. In times of low or stable media coverage, the
perception of a risky technology usually correlates strongly with an attitude
in favor or against the technology. However, in the case of nuclear energy, an
accident or catastrophe in tandem with intensive media coverage will influence
both the risk perception and preexisting attitudes. Accordingly, most surveys
in the aftermath of the accident at Fukushima detected a sharp rise in the
perceived risk and far lower positive attitudes toward nuclear energy than
before (Holmberg, ; Newport, ; Turcanu, Perko, & Schröder,
; Visschers & Siegrist, ), which held true for Switzerland as well
(GfS-Zürich, ).
After the catastrophe at Chernobyl, the influence of media coverage as
risk communication was clear. As Renn (, p. ) summarized it, the
event’s effect on public opinion was ‘‘the more dramatic and enduring, the
more a country was affected by the fallout and the higher the percentage of
indifferent positions toward nuclear power was prior to the accident.’’ In the
context of the accident at Fukushima, Siegrist and Visschers (, p. )
have proposed the term Fukushima effect; for them, previous research has
demonstrated highly stable positive attitudes toward nuclear energy since
the s, mostly owing to the rising price of oil, increased concerns about
climate change, and a lack of convenient alternatives. Although nuclear acci-
dents have usually increased public opposition toward nuclear power directly
afterward, typically caused by the affect heuristic, public opinion also typically
becomes more positive in the United States and Europe later on (Mazur,
).
However, this general prediction differs according to both favorable versus
unfavorable attitudes toward nuclear energy before the events and the strength
of those attitudes (Eaton, Majka, & Visser, ). Whereas strong attitudes
seem to be persistent over time as well as resistant to change, powerful key
events such as nuclear catastrophes can prompt enduring attitudinal changes.
For example, based on their empirical study in Italy, Prati and Zani ()
have concluded that major nuclear accidents can influence values and pro-
environmental beliefs in the long term as a basis of future public attitudes
toward nuclear power.
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Research Questions, Data, and Methods
In this study, we focused on opinion formation toward nuclear energy in
Switzerland in the context following the accident at Fukushima and aimed
to answer two research questions:
RQ: How did general opinion on nuclear energy and the risk perception of nuclear
energy change in the years following the accident at Fukushima?
RQ: How strong was the influence of sociodemographics, risk perceptions, and
media use on the general opinion about nuclear energy?
To answer those questions, we here present results from three surveys con-
ducted in Switzerland in ,  and .
The main variable of interest in this study is the general attitude towards
nuclear energy, assessed with answers on a -point scale ( ¼ In favor,  ¼
Mostly in favor,  ¼ Mostly against,  = Against). Furthermore, based on the
literature review, we include a set of additional variables related to different
dimensions of risk perception, sociodemographic characteristics, and media
use. They included the following: () sociodemographic characteristics such
as age, sex, and education; () language region (German or French speaking)
and canton (i.e., whether a respondent lives in a canton where one or more
nuclear power plants are in operation) as indicators of perceived proximity of
hazard; () the use of media (i.e., frequency of newspaper, radio, television,
and Internet use) on a -point scale ( ¼ Daily,  ¼ Never); and () a
personal assessment of the benefits versus the risks of nuclear energy, as
assessed by answers to the question ‘‘Do you think that the benefits of nuclear
energy justify the risks?’’ on a -point scale ( ¼ Not at all,  ¼ Very much),
opinions on the safety of nuclear power plants in Switzerland, as assessed by
answers to the question ‘‘How safe do you perceive Swiss nuclear power
plants to be?’’ on a -point scale ( ¼ Not safe at all,  ¼ Very safe), and
perceptions of the possibility of a nuclear accident in Switzerland, as assessed
by answers to the question ‘‘Do you worry about the possibility of a nuclear
accident in Switzerland?’’ on a -point scale ( ¼ Not at all,  ¼ Very much).
In the three surveys conducted in Switzerland in , , and , we
assessed Swiss citizens’ general opinion about nuclear energy and the three
dimensions of risk perception regarding it.2 All three surveys were computer-
assisted telephone interviews administered by Demoscope and GfS-Zürich.
The first survey conducted in , a year after the accident at
Fukushima, during March – in all three language regions of Switzerland
2Our study is representative of German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland. For pragmatic
reasons, not all surveys included all language regions, and we therefore omitted some regions from the
study (i.e., the Italian-speaking part), while the Romansh-speaking region, owing to its bilingual nature,
arguably finds a voice in the German-speaking sample.
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(i.e., the German-, French-, and Italian-speaking part). However, we have
excluded results from the Italian-speaking part, which accounts for roughly
% of Switzerland’s population, because the surveys conducted in  and
 excluded it. The sample size for the  survey was  participants.
The second survey conducted in , at approximately the second anniver-
sary of the Fukushima accident, during March –, with , participants,
whereas the third survey took place during May –June ,  and en-
compassed exactly , participants. The number of survey items varied by
year. Table  summarizes variables available for each survey.
As Table  shows, the sample of respondents for all three surveys had a
nearly equal distribution of sexes, an age average of about  years, and a more
or less similar educational distribution. As such, the three surveys are
comparable.
We performed data analysis in two steps. In this article, we present the
descriptive results of the three surveys, which address RQ, and discuss
changes that occurred over time. In the process, we compare changes in
variables directly related to attitudes on nuclear energy.
Second, in response to RQ, we estimated linear regression models for
each survey year. Our general analytical model appears in Figure . The
response variable for each model is the general opinion on nuclear energy,
whereas the set of predictor variables varies for each year, as Table  shows.
In our modeling approach, we primarily focus not on whether the predictor
variables exert a statistically significant influence on the response variable, but
which possible model combination is most likely to correspond to reality in
terms of model fit given the data. During model selection, however, instead of
manually including or excluding predictor variables according to their statis-
tical significance to choose the best model, we resorted to selection according
to the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) per Schwarz (). Although
model selection via information-theoretic criteria is a nonstandard procedure
in the social sciences, the advantages of the approach over more conventional
selection methods are clear (Burnham & Anderson, ). We opted for the
BIC instead of other information criteria, including the Akaike Information
Criterion (Akaike, ), because the BIC puts greater emphasis on the par-
simony of models insofar as it penalizes the introduction of additional param-
eters (Burnham & Anderson, ). Such parsimony translates into higher
consistency in the model selection process (Kuha, ).
We performed model selection within the R statistical environment with
the ‘‘leaps’’ package (Lumley & Miller, ) by comparing all model subsets
(i.e., all combinations of predictor variables). Given the varying number of
available predictor variables per year, there were , models for , 
models for , and , models for .
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Descriptive Results: How Opinions and Risk Perceptions Changed
Table  displays the general attitude toward nuclear energy and the three
dimensions of risk perception in the , , and  surveys.
The general opinion on nuclear energy in Switzerland during these years
suggests that Swiss citizens are typically against nuclear energy. In  and
, the mean was . on a -point scale ( ¼ In favor of nuclear energy, 
¼ Against nuclear energy), while in , the mean changed to ., which
constituted a significant change (p ¼ .) compared with the mean in .3
Table 
Structure of the Samples
Sample descriptive variables
Variable   
n ¼  n ¼  n ¼ 
Female  (.%)  (.%)  (%)






Educationa   (%)  (%)  (%)
  (%)  (%)  (%)
  (%)  (%)  (%)
  (%)  (%)  (%)
  (%)  (%)  (%)
Note.
aWhich education did you complete most recent?  ¼ No finished education or only obligatory school
education etc.;  ¼ Vocational training and obligatory school to vocation training;  ¼ College education
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3We calculated and compared mean values with one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Tukey’s post
hoc test.
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This result indicates that the Swiss were less critical of nuclear energy in 
than in .
The other three variables reported in Table  measured the three dimen-
sions of risk perception. The first gauged whether people consider that the
benefits of nuclear energy justify the risks. As Table  shows, the Swiss
population disagreed with that statement in all years surveyed, but only
slightly. The only significant (p ¼ .) difference occurred between the
means of  (M ¼ .) and  (M ¼ .); in , more people
responded that the benefits of nuclear energy could justify the risks. That
result could indicate that, as time passed, the impact of the accident at
Fukushima on risk perception faded, an interpretation supported by the
other two dimensions of risk perception. In , respondents worried less
about an accident at a Swiss nuclear power plant (M ¼ .) than they did in
 (M ¼ .). Furthermore, respondents considered the safety of Swiss
nuclear power plants to be greater in  (M ¼ .) than in  (M ¼
.). However, those differences were not statistically significant.
Although not all differences among years are sizeable enough to be stat-
istically significant, a picture of the development of attitudes toward nuclear
energy is clear: as time passed after the accident at Fukushima, the more
favorably the Swiss viewed nuclear energy. However, that change in attitude
was modest.
Estimation Results: Explaining the General Opinion About Nuclear
Energy Model Selection Results for the  Survey
Table  shows parameter estimates for the best-fitting model for  survey
data with the general opinion about nuclear energy as the response variable.
The linear model in Table  explains .% of variance (adjusted R ¼
.) in the general public opinion about nuclear energy. Of all initial pre-
dictor variables, only three remained in the best model: respondents’ assess-
ment of the benefits versus the risks of nuclear energy, the perception of the
safety of Swiss nuclear power plants, and the use of local television channels.
Those three variables significantly influenced respondents’ opinions.
Estimates show that respondents more likely to deem the benefits of nu-
clear energy to not justify its risks were more likely to also be against nuclear
energy (B ¼ ., SE ¼  ., p < .). In a similar vein, respondents
who worried about the safety of Swiss nuclear power plants were also more
likely to be against nuclear energy (B ¼ ., SE ¼ ., p < .),
although that effect was more than a quarter weaker than the effect of the
risks-versus-benefits assessment.
The fact that two of the three parameters in the best model for 
pertained to risk perception raises the question of collinearity. However,
with variance inflation factors of . for the benefits-versus-risks variable
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and of . for the safety perception of Swiss nuclear power plants, collin-
earity probably posed no dilemma. An additional analysis of the condition
indices (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, ) performed with the ‘‘perturb’’ R
package (Hendrickx, ) corroborated that finding; the highest condition
index was ., which is below the threshold of , which would suggest
collinearity. However, though the highest condition index was fairly low,
the variance decomposition proportions for the two variables were >..
If the corresponding condition index was not . but some value > instead,
that would suggest probable collinearity.
The third model parameter with an impact was local television use. In
short, the more often respondents reported watching local television stations,
the more likely they were to be against nuclear energy (B ¼ ., SE ¼
., p ¼ .). Albeit small, the effect is notable, for it was the only media
use variable that remained in the best model for the  survey.
Interestingly, the level of worry about an accident at a Swiss nuclear
power plant did not contribute to the best model for . Furthermore,
Table 
Model Selection Result for the  Survey









Risk perception benefit vs. riska . . . . .
Risk perception safety CHb . . . . .
Risk perception accident CH
Public service TV CH




Local TV CHc . . . . .
Local radio CH
Note. Only those parameters where numbers are reported are part of the best fitting model selected by the
BIC. Partial eta-squared and Cohen’s f-squared (Cohen, ) indicate the individual effect size of the given
parameter.
Response variable: Nuclear opinion pro/contra; R ¼  .; Adjusted R ¼  ..
Response variable: What is your opinion on nuclear energy?  ¼ In favor,  ¼ Mostly in favor,  ¼ Mostly
against,  ¼ Against.
aDo you think the benefits of nuclear energy justify the risk?  ¼ Not at all,  ¼ Yes, very much so.
bHow safe do you perceive Swiss nuclear power plants to be?  ¼ Not safe at all,  ¼ Very safe.
cHow often do you use Swiss local TV?  ¼ Daily,  ¼ Several times,  ¼ Once a week,  ¼ Rarely,
 ¼ Never.
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classic sociodemographic variables such as age, sex, and education did not
contribute enough to justify inclusion in the best model for .
Geographical variables also fell by the wayside during model selection. That
is, living in a canton with a nuclear power plant in operation did not contrib-
ute to a meaningful model, nor did the differentiation between the German-
and French-speaking parts of Switzerland.
Model Selection Result for the 2013 Survey
The  survey did not ask any media use questions and excluded the
question of whether respondents worried about an accident at a Swiss nuclear
plant. Table  reports parameter estimates for the best-fitting model for the
 data with the general opinion on nuclear energy as the response variable.
The linear model in Table  explained .% of the variance (adjusted R
¼ .). For the  survey, significant predictor variables were respond-
ents’ age, perception of benefits versus risks, and safety perception of Swiss
nuclear energy plants. As for the  model, the presence of two risk percep-
tion variables in the best-fitting model raises concerns regarding collinearity.
However, with variance inflation factors of . for the risks-versus-benefits
variable and . for the perception of safety of Swiss nuclear power plants,
collinearity again likely posed no dilemma. The highest condition index for the
variables in the  model was ., which supports the notion that collin-
earity was not an issue.
Table 
Model Selection Result for the  Survey









Risk perception benefit vs. riska . . . . .
Risk perception safety CHb . . . . .
Note. Only those parameters where numbers are reported are part of the best fitting model selected by the
BIC. Partial eta-squared and Cohen’s f-squared (Cohen, ) indicate the individual effect size of the given
parameter.
Response variable: Nuclear opinion pro/contra; R ¼  .; Adjusted R ¼  ..
Response variable: What is your opinion on nuclear energy?  ¼ In favor,  ¼ Mostly in favor,  ¼ Mostly
against,  ¼ Against.
aDo you think the benefits of nuclear energy justify the risk?  ¼ Not at all,  ¼ Yes, very much so.
bHow safe do you perceive Swiss nuclear power plants to be?  ¼ Not safe at all,  ¼ Very safe.
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The estimate for age means that the older a respondent was, the more
likely he or she was to favor nuclear energy (B ¼ ., SE ¼ ., p ¼
.). Respondents more likely to not think that the benefits of nuclear energy
justify its risks were more likely to be against nuclear energy (B ¼ .,
SE ¼ ., p < .), as in the  survey. However, compared with the
best-fitting model for , in the best model for , the effect of the
benefits-versus-risks parameter was much stronger. Another similarity with
the  survey was the safety perception of Swiss nuclear power plants;
the more someone worried about the safety of those plants (B ¼ .,
SE ¼ ., p < .), the more likely he or she was against nuclear energy
in general. The effect was highly similar in size to the effect for the 
model. In contrast to the best model for the  survey, age had significant
impact in the  model. However, it was the sole sociodemographic variable
to have an impact because sex and education, along with the two geographical
variables, did not contribute to the best-fitting model.
Model Selection Result for the 2014 Survey
For model selection for the  survey, we once again included variables on
media use, as we did for  data. However, the  survey omitted the
question of whether respondents felt that Swiss nuclear reactors were safe.
Model selection for  data thus occurred with one less variable than for
 data. Table  reports parameter estimates for the best-fitting model for
 data with the general opinion on nuclear energy as the response variable.
The linear model in Table  explained .% of the variance (adjusted R
¼ .). In the  survey, significant predictor variables were respondents’
assessment of the benefits versus the risks of nuclear energy (B ¼ ., SE
¼ ., p < .), their level of worry about an accident at a Swiss nuclear
power plant (B ¼ ., SE ¼ ., p < .), and, once again, the use of
local television channels (B ¼ ., SE ¼ ., p < .). In a pattern
similar to the results for the  and  surveys, two of the three predictor
variables in the best model for the  survey pertained to risk perception.
As with the  and  models, collinearity was likely not an issue.
Variance inflation factors for the assessment of risks versus benefits and for
worry about an accident at a Swiss nuclear power plant were both ..
Additionally, the highest condition index was ., which was slightly greater
than for the  and  models, yet still low enough to suggest that
collinearity likely posed no problem.
One sociodemographic variable that was part of the best model for the 
survey was not present in the  and  models: sex. In short, women were
slightly more likely to be against nuclear energy than men in the  survey.
The estimate of the assessment of risks versus benefits of nuclear energy
once again showed that respondents were more likely to be against nuclear
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energy the less that they thought that the risks justified the benefits.
Furthermore, the more the respondents reported worrying about an accident
at a Swiss nuclear power plant, the more they were against nuclear energy in
general. For the  model selection, the additional variable not present in
the  survey was the perception of safety of Swiss nuclear power plants.
For the best model for  data, safety perception was a significant model
parameter, whereas worry about an accident was not. The presence of worry
about accidents in the best model for  thus requires cautious interpret-
ation. Had the question of safety perception been present in the  survey,
then it is possible that the variable would have been part of the best 
model and not worry about accidents, which could simply be a function of the
safety perception of Swiss nuclear power plants.
An effect observed in the  model reappeared in the  model: the
more the respondents reported watching local television channels, the less
likely they were to favor nuclear energy in general. The effect size was of a
similar scale; though the effect was small, it is nevertheless noteworthy, for it
Table 
Model Selection Result for the  Survey









Risk perception benefit vs. riska . . . . .
Risk perception accident CHb . . . . .
Public service TV CH




Local TV CHc . . . . .
Local radio CH
Note. Only those parameters where numbers are reported are part of the best fitting model selected by the
BIC. Partial eta-squared and Cohen’s f-squared (Cohen, ) indicate the individual effect size of the given
parameter.
Response variable: Nuclear opinion pro/contra; R ¼ .; Adjusted R ¼  ..
Response variable: What is your opinion on nuclear energy?  ¼ In favor,  ¼ Mostly in favor,  ¼ Mostly
against,  ¼ Against.
aDo you think the benefits of nuclear energy justify the risk?  ¼ Not at all,  ¼ Yes, very much so.
bDo you worry about the possibility of a nuclear accident in Switzerland?  ¼ Not at all,  ¼ Very much.
cHow often do you use Swiss local TV?  ¼ Daily,  ¼ Several times a week,  ¼ Once a week,  ¼ Rarely,
 ¼ Never.
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was the sole media use variable that contributed to the best model for 
survey data.
Analysis of Missing Data
We estimated all three models presented in the previous sections as complete
case analyses. If a respondent did not give a specific answer to one or several
of the survey items, then we excluded that respondent from data analysis,
which prompted a loss of data for each sample year, as Figure  illustrates.
Though the loss of data initially seems tolerable—–% of the total data
were complete cases—additional analysis of missing data is necessary. Testing
whether those data are missing completely at random (MCAR; Heitjan &
Basu, ), as proposed by Jamshidian and Jalal (), revealed that only
missing data for the  survey satisfied the condition. To clarify whether
missing data for other years were missing at random or not, we performed an
additional analysis with imputed data using the ‘‘mice’’ R package (van
Buuren & Groothuis–Oudshoorn, ), which operates with predictive
mean matching and logistic regression—the latter for factors only—as imput-
ation techniques. Although there were no fixed criteria for the number of
imputations to perform, we erred on the side of caution and performed 
imputations for each variable, as Graham, Olchowski, and Gilreath ()
suggested. With the imputed data sets, we re-estimated the models for all
years, though because missing data for  were likely MCAR, we calculated
the imputations for  as well.
The results of the multiple imputations reported in Table  strongly
suggest that the missing data posed no major problem and did not introduce
any considerable bias. The parameter estimates as well as the p-values changed
little compared with those in the original models.
Summary
All predictor variables in the three models with best model fit (Tables –)
were statistically significant. However, as statistical significance alone is not
necessarily a meaningful indicator of the real-world relevance of a parameter,
we also analyzed the confidence intervals (CI) of parameter estimates (Cohen,
; Gardner & Altman, ; Jones, ; Nakagawa & Cuthill, ; Poole,
). Figure  depicts the % CI of the parameter estimates for the three
models reported in Tables –.
The parameter with the greatest CI range was the sex estimate for the
 model. Though the estimate was significant at the p< . level, the
impact of the standard error was sizeable. That finding is important, for given
that sex is a dichotomous variable, assumably its relevance is specific, though
in reality, it is broad. As such, in , sex probably mattered as a predictor of
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Figure 
Visual summary of the missing data for each model
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the general attitude toward nuclear energy, but how much it mattered varied
to a relatively high degree. The narrowest CI in Figure  was for the age
estimate in . Although the effect was weak—the variable measures annual
increments—it was specific, with an age estimate of . and CI ranges of
.–..
The other three parameter estimates all had similar CI ranges. CIs for the
 estimates were slightly broader than the same CIs for other years, likely
owing to the smaller sample size of the  survey.
Three parameters depicted in Figure  appeared for at least  years. In
those cases, an overlap of CIs for different years suggests that the real-world
Table 
Model Estimations With the Imputed Data Sets
Year Predictor Estimate SE p n missing Fmi
 Risk perception benefit vs. risk . . .  .
Risk perception safety CH . . .  .
Local TV CH . . .  .
 Risk perception benefit vs. risk . . .  .
Safety . . .  .
Age . . .  .
 Risk perception benefit vs. risk . . .  .
Sex . . .  .
Accident . . .  .
Local TV CH . . .  .
Note. ‘‘Fmi’’ denotes the fraction of missing information (Wagner, ).
Figure 
Parameter point estimates (dots) and % confidence intervals for the parameter point
estimates (error bars)
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effect was the same for those years. Likewise, CIs that did not overlap suggest
that the real-world effect differed for those years. There is one such case of
nonoverlapping CIs for different years: the negative effect of the benefits-
versus-risks assessment by respondents was probably stronger in  than
in .
Discussion
The descriptive results indicate that the general opinion on nuclear energy in
Switzerland is slightly negative. Opinion stabilized in the two years following
the accident at Fukushima, and given the results of the Angstbarometer (GfS-
Zürich, ), Fukushima strongly affected people’s perception of nuclear
energy. Our results nevertheless show that public opinion after the accident
remained relatively stable. Although one might have expected  to be a
dramatically different year and opinion to look different in  as the acci-
dent fades in the public memory, the actual shift in opinions was modest.
Significant changes are observable only for some variables and for some years.
From  to , the general opinion on nuclear energy became slightly less
negative, yet remained rather negative. With a significant change from  to
, the trend toward a slightly more positive assessment of nuclear energy is
also observable regarding answers to the question of whether the benefits of
nuclear energy justify its risks. These findings concur with those of similar
studies that have also found the Fukushima effect to weaken over time
(Siegrist & Visschers, ).
The explanatory results for all three surveys show a clear influence of risk
perception on opinions about nuclear energy. People who do not think that the
benefits justify the risks are more likely to be against nuclear energy in
general.
In  and , the surveys asked respondents whether they worried
about the safety of Swiss nuclear power plants, and in both years, the variable
exerted significant influence: the more an individual reported worrying about
the safety of Swiss nuclear power plants, the more likely he or she was to be
against nuclear energy in general.
Interestingly, the question of whether respondents worried about an acci-
dent at a Swiss nuclear power plant did not influence their general opinion on
nuclear energy in , the year closest to the Fukushima accident. In ,
the survey omitted the question, but in , worry about an accident at a
Swiss nuclear power plant was a significant predictor of respondents’ opinions
on nuclear energy in general. That is, the more they reported worrying about
an accident, the more likely they were to be against nuclear energy.
Sociodemographic variables are only partly relevant in explaining opinions
about nuclear energy. The age of respondents had an impact in  only, and
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respondents’ sex mattered only in . The education of respondents was not
a relevant predictor in any year surveyed. As such, a nuclear accident together
with strong media coverage might have weakened or even closed preexisting
gaps between sociodemographic groups. This can be thought of as one of the
ways in which the Fukushima effect on public opinion manifests. The fact that
sex has a substantial effect in  could indicate that the Fukushima effect,
strong though it might be, is not permanent but has something akin to a half-
life. As the Fukushima effect begins to wear off, the ‘‘usual suspects’’ of
sociodemographic variables seem to matter once again. For the  and
 surveys, a set of variables measured how often respondents used different
news media outlets. The sole relevant finding regarded the use of local tele-
vision, both in  and ; the more often respondents reported watching
local television, the more likely they were to be against nuclear energy. Local
television stations in Switzerland are private businesses, and there is evidence
that they rely on more emotional, sensationalist reporting styles in general and
probably even more when covering controversial issues such as nuclear energy.
Consequently, local television in Switzerland could exert a negative affective
effect on audiences. In that light, risk perception seems to be the strongest
predictor of someone’s opinion.
Conclusion
Our study yielded two primary results. First, the general opinion of nuclear
energy and the different dimensions of risk perceptions have changed since the
accident at Fukushima. Simply put, Swiss citizens have become more accepting
of nuclear energy. This finding suggests that the accident at Fukushima trig-
gered a change in opinion, and as time passed, public opinion on nuclear energy
shifted back to its preaccident levels. That trend, however, was slow, given that
the changes in attitude were relatively small. It remains unclear from our results
alone whether and how long that trend will continue into the future.
Second, the most consistent and strongest predictor of the general opinion
about nuclear energy was the answer to the question of whether the benefits of
nuclear energy justify its risks. The more an individual considers that the
benefits are worth the risks, the more he or she has a positive opinion
about nuclear energy in general. This finding strongly suggests that the opin-
ion on nuclear energy results from a rational process, not an affective one, at
least in situations with strong media coverage. In that sense, thinking about
the benefits and the risks of nuclear energy and deciding what one values to be
more relevant is a complex cognitive task. Of course, it is possible that an
individual weighing benefits and risks is not fully rational, but influenced by
confirmation bias.
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The limitations of the study are aspects that researchers should analyze
more thoroughly in future studies. Though not crucial, the first limitation
needs attention in future research: We omitted the Italian-speaking part of
Switzerland from our data, which resulted in the exclusion of roughly % of
the Swiss population from our samples. For the sake of best possible repre-
sentativeness, future research should therefore include the Italian-speaking
part of Switzerland.
Moreover, we asked respondents only whether they considered the bene-
fits of nuclear energy to justify the risks. What exactly respondents considered
to be benefits and risks, however, remains uncertain. Future research should
address that aspect, not least because it would help to clarify the potential for
confirmation bias. For example, if a person named several risks, but could not
name any benefit, then that could indicate confirmation bias more than ra-
tional decision-making. That dimension merits further exploration, for the
question taps directly into the nature of human cognition, as explained by
the dual mode of thinking (Frankish, ). In short, is risk perception the
result of deliberate, rational analysis (i.e., rational choice) or of irrational heur-
istics (i.e., behavioral economics)?
Another finding that merits attention in the future is the role of news media.
The only relevant effect that we found was a relationship between the general
opinion on nuclear energy and use of local television. This finding calls for a
content analysis of news media to assess whether different news media types
have such differences in the quantity and quality of reporting. A methodical
triangulation of such a content analysis with survey data could hold valuable
empirical insights, especially from a perspective focused on the social amplifi-
cation of risk (e.g., Kasperson et al., ). Furthermore, we need to develop a
better understanding of public communication in times of severe crises that
influence perceptions of risks. In the context of the Fukushima accident, the
trigger event did not simply prompt regular levels of media coverage. Instead,
the Fukushima accident became an issue that overshadowed all other current
issues at the time. As such, the Fukushima accident was an event with hypersa-
lience: It did not compete with other issues for salience because it completely
dominated media coverage. Consequently, it is not surprising that we found no
strong media effects in our models: The Fukushima accident as a hypersalient
event was omnipresent in the media, and therefore, the amount of media usage
did not matter—there was no way to avoid being exposed to communication
about the Fukushima accident, even for individuals with low levels of media
consumption.
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